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JOINT TENANCIES AND "CREATIVE FINANCING"-
THE LAND CONTRACT
Robert Kratovil*
The drying up of institutional mortgage money in recent years
has resulted in a burgeoning of "creative financing" of home sales.
Newspaper advertisements often seek to attract buyers by stating
that "owner financing is available" or that the "mortgage is assuma-
ble."' Another form of "creative financing" is the installment con-
tract, which is commonplace in jurisdictions in which the simplified
forfeiture process offers a quick and inexpensive means of extin-
guishing the rights of a defaulting purchaser.2 Many of the homes
financed by this method are owned by a husband and wife in joint
tenancy.3 A question that will therefore recur is what effect the exe-
cution of an installment contract by the joint tenants will have on an
existing joint tenancy.
* Professor of Law, John Marshall School of Law; Former Vice President Chicago
Title Insurance Company; J.D., DePaul University; author REAL ESTATE LAW (7th ed.
1979); MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1979); MODERN REAL ESTATE
DOCUMENTATION (1975).
1. This statement indicates that the mortgage lacks a due-on-sale clause or that in the
jurisdiction in question the due-on-sale clause exists but is deemed unenforceable in the
circumstances. Kratovil, A New Dilemma/or Thrift Institutions.- Judicial Emasculation of the
Due on Sale Clause, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 299 (1979).
2. Kratovil, Forfeiture of Installment Contracts in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 188 (1964). See
also G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 3.25 et seq.
(1979).
3. Mattis, Severance of Joint Tenancies by Mortgages." A Contextual Approach, 1977 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 27, 39.
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The decision best known in this area is In re Baker's Estate.4 A
husband and wife who owned land in joint tenancy entered into an
installment contract. The husband died during the life of the con-
tract. The court held that the joint tenancy in the legal title had
been severed by the execution of the contract, thus destroying the
right of survivorship. The right to receive the contract proceeds was
therefore held in tenancy in common. The doctrine of equitable
conversion was invoked to sustain the holding of severance. The
court held that the contract effected an equitable conversion of the
realty into personalty.5 Five judges joined in this opinion and four
dissented. 6
The holding in Baker's Estate virtually compels the probating
of the estate of the decedent. Since a deed will be needed from the
decedent's heirs if he dies intestate, heirship must be adjudicated. If
the decedent died testate, the will must be admitted. Since the pre-
cise purpose of electing to hold land in joint tenancy is avoidance of
the expense of probate, the Baker's Estate decision frustrates the in-
tention of the parties. Such frustration should be avoided in the
absence of some compelling public policy. The decision is devoid of
any suggestion that such policy exists. The situation deserves close
scrutiny.
Whether a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common is created is
4. 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956). Baker's Estate remains accepted doctrine in
Iowa. Iowa Title Standard § 4.11, 36 IowA CODE ANN. § 558 appendix (West 1981).
5. In re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863, 868-69 (1956). The court dis-
cussed the contention that the intent of the parties should prevail but found no intent to have
a right of survivorship in the proceeds of the sale.
6. Both opinions noted the existence of law to the contrary. Eg., Watson v. Watson, 5
I11. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955). Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 I11. 2d 344, 153
N.E.2d 59 (1958) cites cases from Massachusetts and Florida as also going contra to Baker's
Estate. The contra cases, it is said, serve better to carry out the intention of the parties, for
the act of contracting to sell merely substitutes rights in money for rights in land. Id. at 347,
153 N.E.2d at 63. Thus these contra cases reach the result that the chose in action repre-
sented by the seller's contract claim against the buyer is owned in joint tenancy. See also
Taylor v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 682, 65 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1968) (pro-
ceeds of joint tenancy property said to retain character of property from which they were
acquired absent a contrary agreement); In re Maguire's Estate, 152 A.D. 337, 296 N.Y.S. 528
(1937) (tenants by entirety who enter into contract of sale remain tenants by entirety in
proceeds).
There are also decisions that adhere to the position taken in Baker's Estate. E.g.,
Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954) criticized in Swenson & Degnan,
Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. REV. 466 (1954) and Note, Real Property.- Coten-
ancy. Effect of a Contract to Convey by Joint Tenants. Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62
N. W2d 252, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 154 (1954). There is an annotation dealing with the ques-
tion. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918, 936 (1959).
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largely a matter of intention.' In like manner it has been held that
the question of severance is basically a question of intention.8 It
might reasonably be supposed that a jurisdiction, like Iowa, that de-
clares intention to be the crucial test with respect to creation of a
joint tenancy should also hold intention to be the primary test for
severance.
9
In a typical case in which a husband and wife purchase a home
and take title in joint tenancy, there is every indication that they
wish to create a right of survivorship and to avoid the expense of
probate. If they sell the home on an installment contract, the over-
whelming probability is that this "creative financing" device was re-
sorted to because institutional financing was unavailable. The Iowa
court in Baker's Estate deals two blows to the parties. First, the
joint tenancy in the legal title is severed, so that the deed to the
purchasers must come from the heirs or devisees of the deceased
joint tenant and from the surviving joint tenant. Thus, probate of
the estate becomes necessary. Second, the surviving joint tenant is
deprived of half the proceeds of the sale.
Therefore, the real issue relates to the intention of the parties
regarding the right of survivorship in the proceeds of sale. Persons
of limited means who wish to avoid the expense of probate strongly
favor the right of survivorship. This is especially true of a husband
and wife. When their intent to create a right of survivorship is evi-
dent, it should be given effect by the court.
A conceptual view of the problem is helpful. The conspicuous
characteristic of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship.' 0 For
such a right to exist it must be included in the bundle of rights called
"property."I Each joint tenant's bundle of rights is regarded as in-
7. Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946) (deed by landowner to self and
wife in joint tenancy held to create joint tenancy rejecting requirement of four unities and
pointing out that contra Nebraska case was promptly overruled by legislature); Spark v.
Brown, 167 Kan. 159, 205 P.2d 938 (1949); Isherwood v. Springs First Nat'l Bank, 365 Pa.
225, 74 A.2d 89 (1950).
8. Bradley v. Mann, 34 Colo. App. 135, 525 P.2d 492 (1974).
9. Comment, Joint Tenancies-Severance-Effect of Contract to Sell, 42 IowA L. REV.
646, 648 (1957).
10. Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 933 (1961).
11. Property consists of an aggregate or bundle of rights protected by the government.
Perhaps the oldest decision is the one that is best known. Easton v. Boston C. & M. R.R., 51
N.H. 504, 511 (1872). For the historical development of this view, see Kratovil and Harri-
son, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 599 (1954). The old
property law decisions throw no light upon the right of survivorship as a property right
viewed from a modem constitutional law perspective. That it is indeed a property right
protected by constitutional principles is clear. Thus it has been held that a rule established
1982]
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cluding the right of survivorship, conditioned upon the right of sev-
erance either by the voluntary act of the other joint tenant or by an
involuntary process against the other joint tenant, such as an execu-
tion sale and deed.' 2 There is no rule of law that requires this por-
tion of the bundle of rights to remain inviolate until one joint tenant
dies.' 3 When a transaction takes place that results in an equal re-
duction of each joint tenant's bundle of rights, there is no severance.
This universally accepted proposition is well illustrated by the situa-
tion in which both joint tenants execute a real estate mortgage. In
such a case, the quantum of the subtraction varies from state to
state. In title theory states, some sort of legal title vests in the mort-
gagee. The estate of the joint tenants, however, less this defeasible
legal title, remains a joint tenancy. In lien theory states the quan-
tum of the interest vested in the mortgagee and thus subtracted from
the estate of the joint tenants is smaller or, at any rate, different.
The result is the same: the estate remains a joint tenancy. If this
equal subtraction principle represents an accepted viewpoint, as in-
deed it does, it is difficult to justify a refusal to apply it to a contract
of sale."4
It is everywhere conceded that the right of survivorship exists
only at the will of each joint tenant. Either joint tenant may sever
it.' 5 A conveyance by one joint tenant is only one act that may re-
sult in a severance. Severance also occurs when the act destroys one
of the four unities: title, time, interest, and possession. 16 There are
by a line of judicial decisions that protects the joint tenant's right of survivorship cannot be
annulled retroactively by a subsequent decision overruling these former decisions. Jackson
v. Fillmore, 367 So. 2d 948 (Ala. 1979).
12. In re Estate of Larendon, 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763 (1970).
13. E.g. Wilcoxen v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1969); Wardlow v.
Pozzi, 170 Cal. App. 2d 208, 338 P.2d 564 (1959); Cole v. Cole, 139 Cal. App. 2d 691, 294
P.2d 494 (1956); Grishaver v. Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1961); Reilly v. Sageser, 2 Wash.
App. 6, 467 P.2d 358 (1970). See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918, 923 (1959).
14. When both joint tenants join in a mortgage there is no severance. Illinois Pub. Aid
Comm'n v. Stile, 14 Ill. 2d 344, 153 N.E.2d 59, 63 (1958); Estate of Kotz, 486 Pa. 444, 406
A.2d 524 (1979); Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957). Such a mortgage in
no way disturbs the four unities. Estate of Kotz, 486 Pa. 444, 406 A.2d 524 (1979). Likewise
the joint tenancy is not severed where the joint tenants join in a lease of the premises. Gil-
lette v. Nicolls, 121 Cal. App. 2d 185, 262 P.2d 856 (1953). When all joint tenants concur in
an act, there is no adverse act which would terminate the joint tenancy. Hewitt v. Biege, 183
Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958).
15. See supra note 13. See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 918 (1959).
16. See, e.g., People v. Nogarr, 164 Cal. App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958); In re Zaring's
Estate, 93 Cal. App. 2d 577, 209 P.2d 642 (1949); Kozacik v. Kozacik, 157 Fla. 597, 26 So. 2d
659 (1946); Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d 903 (1946); Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390
Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945); DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956); In
re Whitesides Estate, 159 Neb. 362, 67 N.W.2d 141 (1954); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J.
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differences of opinion about whether and when, the unilateral act of
one of the tenants will sever a joint tenancy. For example, there are
various views regarding the effect of the execution of a mortgage by
one joint tenant.' 7 Under the equal subtraction view, there is no
necessary disturbance of the four unities when both joint tenants
agree to the transaction. The estate that remains in the joint tenants
possesses all the requirements relative to the four unities. 8
Little is to be gained by focusing attention on the nature of the
cotenancy created in this type of problem. As discussed earlier the
real issue relates to the intention of the parties regarding the right of
survivorship. A husband and wife who acquire their home as joint
tenants intend, in most cases, to create a right of survivorship. The
question to be answered, then, is whether this intention should be
frustrated by adherence to the technical rules governing joint tenan-
cies. Clearly, public policy favors giving effect to the intention of
the parties.
Statutes in many states reverse the common law presumption of
joint tenancy and create a tenancy in common when the deed is
silent.' 9 Statutes in other states go further and abolish the right of
survivorship in joint tenancies. 20 Even in this latter group of states,
however, if the deed to the joint tenants adds language of survivor-
ship, a right of survivorship exists. 2' Thus, even when the legisla-
ture has expressed its distaste for the right of survivorship, courts
recognize that this is a matter best left to the intention of the parties.
Eq. 176, 21 A.2d 743 (1941); Bassler v. Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. 26, 109 N.W. 1032 (1906).
Mattis, Severance of Joint Tenancies by Mortgages.: A Contextual Approach, 1977 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 27.
17. Some courts hold that a mortgage by one joint tenant severs the joint tenancy. See
Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 111. 2d 344, 53 N.E.2d 59 (1958); Hardin v. Wolf, 318
111. 48, 148 N.E. 868 (1925); Eder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 95 A.2d 860 (1953); Tracy-
Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956). But see D. A. D., Inc. v.
Moring, 218 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
McGinnis, 571 P.2d 1198 (Okla. 1977).
18. How far the doctrine of equal subtraction can be pushed is a matter for conjecture.
If the joint tenants join in a conveyance of a determinable fee, it is unclear whether the
resulting possibility of reverter would be owned in joint tenancy. Kratovil, Divided Interests
in Land- Enforcement Problems Under Modern Concepts of Real Property Law, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 583 (1977).
19. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, § 1 (1981).
20. Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); see 48A C.J.S. Joint
Tenancy §§ 5, 10 (1981).
21. Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N.W.2d 271 (1948); Bunting v. Cobb, 234 N.C.
132, 66 S.E.2d 661 (1951); Holohan v. Melville, 41 Wash. 2d 380, 249 P.2d 777, reh'g denied,
41 Wash. 2d 380, 255 P.2d 899 (1952). Courts have no right to deprive the parties of their
right to create a joint tenancy. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 491, 156 S.W.2d 827
(1941); Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 A. 733 (1934).
1982] 479
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There are other situations in which the courts have consistently
given effect to the parties' intent to create a right of survivorship.
Deeds are often drawn by unskilled non-lawyers who fail to follow
the prescribed procedure for creating a joint tenancy. Even in these
cases, courts are not reluctant to come to the rescue. For example, a
husband owned land and executed a deed of a half interest to his
wife, stating that they were to hold the land as joint tenants. The
court, recognizing substance over form, held that although the deed
did not create a joint tenancy, a right of survivorship was created
which could be annexed to an estate in common.22 The intention to
create a right of survivorship prevails. Either by statute or court
decision, a deed by a landowner to himself and another as joint ten-
ants will, in most states, create a joint tenancy despite the absence of
the traditional four unities.23
Another area in which courts focus on the intent of the parties
is when an attempt to create a tenancy by the entirety has been de-
fective. A tenancy by the entirety, with its attendant right of survi-
vorship, continues to exist in a number of states as between a
husband and wife. 24 Quite often, however, parties who are not le-
gally married regard themselves as married persons and take title to
land by a deed describing them as tenants by the entirety. A
number of courts fasten upon the obvious intention to create survi-
vorship rights and treat the cotenancy as a joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship.25 Some courts take this a step further. Thus it
has been held that a deed to two sisters "as tenants by the entireties"
created a joint tenancy26 and a deed to two brothers "as tenants by
22. Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S.W.2d 1016 (1948).
23. E.g., Kleeman v. Sheridan, 75 Ariz. 311,256 P.2d 553 (1953); Blevins v. Palmer, 172
Cal. App. 2d 324, 342 P.2d 356 (1959); Curtis v. Smithers, 20 Conn. Supp. 321, 134 A.2d 576
(1957); Florida Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Gann, 101 So. 2d 579 (Fla. App. 1958); Switzer
v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N.W.2d 837 (1946); Siegel v. Hackler, 181 Kan. 316, 310 P.2d 914
(1957); Haynes v. Barker, 239 S.W.2d 996 (Ky. 1951); Creek v. Union Nat'l Bank, 266
S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1954); Brown v. Jackson, 35 N.M. 604, 4 P.2d 1081 (1931).
24. Pierce v. Hall, 223 Or. 563, 355 P.2d 259 (1960). Seealso Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 1189,
1192 (1981).
25. Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morris v. McCarty, 158 Mass. 11,
32 N.E. 938 (1893); Righter v. Righter, 442 Pa. 428, 275 A.2d 4 (1971); Kepner, The Effect of
an Attempted Creation ofan Estate by the Entirely in Unmarried Grantees, 6 RUTGERS L.
REV. 550 (1952); Note, Real Property-Tenancy by Entirety-Joint Tenants-Deed Purporting
to Convey Property by the Entireties to Man and Woman not Legaly Married Created a Joint
Tenancy, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 441 (1962); Note, Real Property: Co-Ownership by Husband
and Wife: Creation of a Tenancy by the Entirety by a Conveyance to Three or More, Two of
Whom are Husband and Wfe: Heatter v. Lucas, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 316 (1952).
26. In re Richardson's Estate, 229 Wis. 426, 282 N.W. 585 (1938).
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the entireties" also created a joint tenancy.27 It is obvious that such
courts focus on the intention of the parties. When the parties intend
to create a right of survivorship, that intention is given effect, re-
gardless of the ineptitude with which that intention is expressed.
This view reflects a sound public policy. When ancient shibboleths
frustrate the intention of the parties, it is intention that must prevail.
Emphasis is placed, as it deserves to be, upon the wish to create
survivorship rights, not upon the technical nature of the tenancy
created.28
Courts have also given effect to the parties' intentions regarding
the disposition of personalty derived from property held in tenancy
by the entirety. Suppose, for example, that a husband and wife own
land as tenants by the entirety. They sell the land and take a
purchase money mortgage. Some courts have held, in such cases,
that the mortgage is owned in tenancy by the entirety and passes to
the survivor.29 As a further example, a husband and wife owned
land as tenants by the entirety and the fee simple title was con-
demned. The condemnation award was held to be owned in ten-
ancy by the entirety and passed to the survivor upon the death of
one of the tenants.3° The holding is a recognition, in a cognate situ-
ation, that the election of a survivorship estate is evidence that the
joint tenants intended survivorship rights in the proceeds of the sale,
as well as of the estate.3'
Shifting our focus from the intent of the parties, an argument
has been made that the doctrine of equitable conversion would sup-
27. Penn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 432 Pa. 262, 247 A.2d 771 (1968).
28. See Coleman v. Jackson, 286 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 933
(1961); Wood v. Wood, 264 Ark. 304, 571 S.W.2d 84 (1978); Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 491,
243 A.2d 588 (1968); Frederick v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949). But see
Higgins v. Higgins, 146 So. 2d 122 (Fla. App. 1962); Fuss v. Fuss, 373 Mass. 445, 368 N.E.2d
276 (1977); Keller v. Porchey, 560 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1977); Mitchner v. Taylor, 56
Tenn. App. 670, 412 S.W.2d 1 (1965).
29. Ciconte v. Barba, 19 Del. Ch. 6, 161 A. 925 (1932). Contra Webb v. Woodcock, 134
Or. 319, 290 P. 751 (1930). See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 8, 47 (1959).
30. Smith v. Tipping, 349 Mass. 590, 211 N.E.2d 231 (1965); In re Idlewild Airport, 85
N.Y.S.2d 617 (1948).
31. Survey of Utah Law-1964, 9 UTAH L. REV. 749, 768 (1965) comments on Allred v.
Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964) and argues that:
A tenancy formed by a husband and wife and subject to survivorship should be
considered as a calculated arrangement for holding wealth and an alteration in the
form of that wealth should not affect the manner in which it is held. Since the
parties intended the surviving joint tenant to own all of the real property, it logi-
cally follows that, absent the manifestation of a contrary intent, they should also




port a finding of a right of survivorship in the proceeds of the sale.
In Baker's Estate the doctrine of equitable conversion was invoked
in support of the court's conclusion that a severance of the joint ten-
ancy had occurred. The doctrine of equitable conversion com-
mands much support.32 Properly applied, however, the doctrine
requires a holding at variance with that reached in Baker's Estate.
Under the doctrine, the moment the contract of sale is signed, the
vendor is deemed to hold the legal title in trust for the purchaser,
who acquires an equitable title.33
The legal title held by trustees has always occupied a special
niche in joint tenancy law. The statutory reversal of the common
law presumption that grantees take as joint tenants was never appli-
cable to a title held by joint trustees. These titles have always been
deemed to be held in joint tenancy. 34 The reason is that the heirs of
a deceased trustee cannot administer the trust. There is no reason to
vest them with a legal title that would compel the trust estate to
probate an estate in order to acquire a dormant legal title. More-
over, minor heirs would be unable to convey their dormant legal
title. In short, it is inconvenient to permit the title of a deceased
joint trustee to pass to his heirs. The foregoing reasoning is also true
of the "trust" title held by joint vendors. It is a matter of conven-
ience to permit this "trust" title to pass to the surviving trustee. The
survivor has power to receive contract payments, 35 and he has the
power to convey title to a purchaser who has fully performed.36
32. As to equitable conversion, see generally Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d
218 (1962); 91 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 106 (1955).
33. Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962). The doctrine has some inter-
esting and beneficial consequences for the purchasers in those states that apply it to its fullest
extent. Since the vendor is deemed to hold the legal title in trust for the purchaser, subse-
quent judgments against the vendor create no liens on the land; the naked legal title of a
trustee will not support judgment liens. Reuss v. Nixon, 272 Il. App. 219 (1933); Lynch v.
Eifer, 191 Ill. App. 244 (1915); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1505, 1515 (1933).
34. See, e.g., Liden's Estate v. Foster, 103 Colo. 58, 82 P.2d 775 (1938); Stout v. Van
Zante, 109 Or. 430, 220 P. 414 (1923).
35. Little attention has been given to the problems of the purchaser where one joint
tenant seller dies. Clearly, the purchaser discharges his legal obligation by making payment
to the survivor. Ehrlich v. Mulligan, 104 N.J.L. 375, 140 A. 463 (1928); 70 C.J.S. Payment
§ 4 (1951). Of course, the survivor who receives such payment will be liable to the estate of
the decedent in jurisdictions that follow Baker's Estate. Nevertheless, it is important to
distinguish the payment problem from the problem of determining ownership of the pro-
ceeds of sale.
36. In those states that permit the chose in action represented in the unpaid purchase
price to pass to the estate of the deceased vendor the surviving joint vendor would be ac-




These matters are not dealt with in Baker's Estate. Perhaps the at-
torneys involved failed in their duty to the court to explore all facets
of the situation.
In truth, the doctrine of equitable conversion has nothing
whatever to do with this problem. Thus in In re Estate of Rickner
37
the court held, on facts like those in Baker's Estate, that the surviv-
ing joint tenant was entitled to the contract proceeds because
through equitable conversion, there was a mere change of form
from real estate to proceeds of sale. In In re Estate of King,38 on
identical facts, the court held for the surviving joint tenant because
there was no conversion at all, merely a change in the form of the
assets. And in Hewitt v. Biege39 the court held for the surviving joint
tenant on the theory of mere change of form, without discussing
conversion at all. Moreover, in equitable conversion, the legal title
remaining in the seller is a naked legal title held in trust for the
purchaser " and, as stated earlier, a legal title held by two or more
trustees is held in joint tenancy even when there is no language re-
quiring it.4
It is always easier to grasp a problem if the subject matter is
identified. A seller's right to enforce his contract claim against the
purchaser is a chose in action.42 Like any other contract claim, a
chose in action can run in favor of two or more persons. It can also
run in favor of two or more persons as joint tenants.43 In states that
recognize tenancy by the entireties in personalty, this chose in action
can be held in tenancy by the entireties by sellers who are husband
and wife. 4
37. 164 Mont. 51, 518 P.2d 1160 (1974).
38. 572 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1978).
39. 183 Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958).
40. Shay v. Penrose, 25 Ill. 2d 447, 185 N.E.2d 218 (1962).
41. See cases cited supra note 34.
42. Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227, 232 (1943). When land is
sold on contract, a vendor's interest therein ceases to be "real estate" and becomes a "chose
in action." This chose in action is personal property. Hewitt v. Biege, 183 Kan. 352, 327
P.2d 872 (1958).
43. See decisions supra note 6. These decisions hold that joint tenants who enter into a
contract of sale thereby acquire a chose in action (contract right against buyer) that, like
their former estate in the land, is held in joint tenancy. To like effect are all the other
decisions reaching a result contrary to that in Baker's Estate. Hughes v. Hughes, 171 Ind.
App. 255, 356 N.E.2d 225 (1976); Hewitt v. Biege, 183 Kan. 352, 327 P.2d 872 (1958); In re
Estate of Rickner, 164 Mont. 51, 518 P.2d 1160 (1974); In re Estate of King, 572 S.W.2d 200
(Mo. App. 1978).
44. See DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964), noted in Comment,
Tenancy by the Entirety in Personalty in Michigan: De Young v. Mesler, 42 U. DET. L.J. 362
(1964). Thus, where a mortgage executed by tenants by the entirety is foreclosed, the surplus
19821 483
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The issue, then, is whether, when joint tenants sell their prop-
erty on credit, the chose in action they acquire is held by them in
joint tenancy if the documents are silent on the subject. There is a
statutory presumption that a tenancy in common arises unless an
intention to create a joint tenancy is expressed.45  This is not the
analysis given in Baker's Estate. Contrary to the holding in Baker's
Estate, there is no problem of severance of joint tenancy with regard
to the chose in action. The issue is whether there was, at the outset,
a joint tenancy in the newly created chose in action.
This presents a serious problem. To hold, in defiance of the
statutes, that a joint tenancy exists in a chose in action even in the
absence of any survivorship language is a formidable piece of judi-
cial legislation. It is possible, of course, to accept the explanation
that when real estate held in joint tenancy is converted into personal
property, the joint tenancy automatically attaches to the personal
property. This conversion theory is best illustrated in the decisions
holding that when land owned in tenancy by the entirety is con-
demned, the eminent domain award is owned by the husband and
wife in joint tenancy.46
Rules of statutory construction may also lead to a holding con-
trary to Baker's Estate. Unfortunate results are often the conse-
quence of statutes construed literally. There is no need for this.
Innumerable decisions teach us that it is the spirit of the statute that
must guide us. Where the spirit dictates a result different from that
proceeds at the foreclosure sale is owned by the mortgagors in tenancy by the entirety. E.g.,
Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N.E.2d 716 (1952); Hamrick v. Lasky, 107 S.W.2d
201 (Mo. App. 1937); Stretz v. Zolkoski, 118 Misc. 806, 195 N.Y.S. 46 (1922). This is be-
cause a tenancy by the entirety, unlike a joint tenancy, cannot be severed. Carlisle v. Parker,
38 Del. 83, 188 A. 67 (1936). In these states a mortgage running to a husband and wife is
held by them in tenancy by the entirety. Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W.2d 198
(1947); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925); Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660,
31 A.2d 718 (1943). There are some jurisdictions that refuse to recognize a tenancy by the
entirety in personal property. Panushka v. Panushka, 221 Or. 145, 349 P.2d 450 (1960) noted
in Recent Cases, Real Property-Estate by Entirety-Equitable Conversion Converts Owner-
ship of Proceeds to Tenancy in Common Absent a Contrary Intent, 14 VAND. L. REV. 687
(1961). Joint tenancies in some types of personal property, notably bank accounts have been
the subject of legislation. Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank, 31 Ill. 2d 587, 202
N.E.2d 470 (1964); Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962). However, there is
no significant body of legislation applicable to jointly owned choses in action arising out of
installment sales.
45. See, supra text accompanying notes 19-20. This problem becomes even more formi-
dable in those jurisdictions that have abolished the right of survivorship in joint tenancies.
See generally, Moss and Siebert, Classgfication and Creation of Joint Interest, 1959 U. ILL.
L.F. 883, 912.
46. See cases cited supra note 30. Of course, it is arguable that in eminent domain the
conversion is involuntary, and that this makes a difference.
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required by the letter of the statute, it is the spirit that prevails.47
When we have nothing except a deed running to two grantees, the
law requires that they be regarded as tenants in common, except, of
course, in community property states. But when other documents
exist that provide reliable guidance regarding the intention of the
parties, these must be consulted. The laws do not forbid creation of
a right of survivorship. To the contrary, the decisions make it clear
that any obvious expression of an intention that a right of survivor-
ship exists must be given effect. 48 Nor do the statutes require that
such intention be expressed in any particular way. When a husband
and wife take title as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, it
would be hard to find a clearer expression of an intention that this
asset should pass to the survivor. When husband and wife enter
into a contract of sale that expresses no contrary intention, most
courts simply indulge the inference that the previously expressed in-
tention must carry over into the proceeds of sale. Nothing in the
statutes forbids this result. To be sure, good draftsmanship suggests
that this continuing intention be spelled out by making the contract
proceeds payable to the sellers "as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship and not as tenants in common or as tenants by the en-
tirety or as community property." Given the strong trend toward
emphasizing the factor of intention, however, the decisions that re-
fuse to follow Baker's Estate undoubtedly rest on solid ground. In a
majority of the states, when a sole owner conveys to himself and
another as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, the intention
to create survivorship rights prevails despite the absence of the four
unities.49 The philosophy is that the bungling of conveyances must
not be permitted to. defeat the intention of the parties. Baker's Es-
tate punishes the clients for the bungling of their attorneys.
Another unfortunate aspect of the holding in Baker's Estate
surfaces when the purchaser defaults. In the absence of equities
favoring the purchaser, the remedy of forefeiture is still available to
47. E.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947); United States v. Yee Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (D. Cal.
1952); City of Birmingham v. Hendrix, 257 Alz. 300, 58 So. 2d 626 (1952); Great W. Mush-
room Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 103 Colo. 39, 82 P.2d 751 (1938); Beebe v. Richardson, 156 Fla.
559, 23 So. 2d 718 (1945); Thornhill v. Ford, 56 So. 2d 23 (Miss. 1952); 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 325 (1953).
48. E.g., In re Wilson's Estate, 404 I11. 207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949); In re Estate of
Louden, 249 Iowa 1393, 92 N.W.2d 409 (1958); Longacre v. Knowles, 333 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.
1960); In re Estate of Whiteside, 159 Neb. 362, 67 N.W.2d 141 (1954); Williams v. Jones, 175
Wis. 380, 185 N.W. 231 (1921); 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 4 (1981).
49. See cases cited supra note 23.
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the vendor in many jurisdictions when the purchaser defaults."
When this occurs the equitable interest of the purchasers no longer
exists.5' Under the rule in Baker's Estate the vendors would own
the land as tenants in common, since their joint tenancy has been
severed. This is regrettable. It certainly is an unintended result.
Considered from the standpoint of both policy and concept, the
decision in Baker's Estate seems wanting in logic. As creative
financing places these cases before the courts in greater numbers, it
seems desirable that the contrary line of decisions be followed. Leg-
islation clarifying the law to be applied to tenancies by the entirety
would be desirable.
Meanwhile it would be helpful if attorneys, when drafting land
contracts executed by joint tenants as vendors, would insert the ap-
propriate language in the contract. This would dispose of the ques-
tion regarding the joint tenancy in the chose in action represented
by the contract price.
There remains the question of possible severance of the joint
tenancy in the legal title retained by the vendors. Perhaps the best
way to cope with the problem is to insert in the dispositive portion
of the contract in the description of the vendors that "the vendors as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship agree to sell." The courts
following Baker's Estate would be likely to hold that the joint ten-
ancy in the legal title is not severed when the intention to avoid
severance is plainly expressed.
To put the payment problem into explicit language, it would be
desirable to state that "at any time hereafter, including any period
after the death of either vendor, payment of any sum due hereunder
made to either vendor constitutes valid payment." It might be ad-
ded that "the recital in any deed executed by either vendor that the
other has died shall constitute conclusive evidence of that fact to the
purchaser or his or their assigns."
While this article has not addressed the question of the coten-
ancy between two or more purchasers, it is plain that this is a prob-
lem at least as important as that discussed in this article. Careful
draftsmanship can also deal competently with this problem. In any
case, a greater awareness of cotenancy problems in credit sales is
needed.
50. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n v. Astirs, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 422, 411 N.E.2d 1050 (1980).
51. Id.
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